This paper examines empirically the effects of multiple banking relationships on the cost and availability of credit. The analysis is based on an unbalanced panel data set for Japanese small and medium-sized firms over the period 2000 -2002 Hausman-Taylor estimator is used to allow for possible correlation between unobservable heterogeneity among firms and multiple banking relationships. The results suggest that the cost of credit is positively correlated with the number of banking relationships when the endogeneity of the banking relationships is considered.
Introduction
Relational banking plays an important role in overcoming credit constraints for small businesses. In the presence of informational asymmetry, adverse selection and moral hazard can lead to credit rationing -a problem that can be overcome by banking relationships, which, over time, help the bank to obtain information on the borrowing firm's unobservable qualities and thus mitigate credit rationing. A growing body of theoretical literature examines the costs and benefits of banking relationships, suggesting that long-term exclusive banking relationships can relax the credit constraints of less well-known firms. On the other hand, such relationships potentially allow banks to extract rent by exploiting the informational monopoly power they possess over a firm if the quality of the firm is good but unobservable and the firm has good investment opportunities (Sharpe 1990; Rajan 1992; von Thadden 1995) . At the same time, however, informationally opaque firms with a single banking relationship are vulnerable to liquidity shocks to their first bank: unable to borrow from their preferred bank, such businesses may be unable to obtain financing from other, non-relational banks, which fear they might be dealing with a "lemon" (Detragiache, Garella, and Guiso 2000) . Thus, in order to ensure stable financing, firms of both good and bad quality typically choose multiple sources, i.e. they enter multiple banking relationships.
A growing number of empirical studies, using cross-section data on small and medium-sized firms, explore the effect of multiple banking relationships on the cost and availability of credit. However, most of these studies do not consider the endogeneity of banking relationships and credit contract terms. When the information obtained through relationships is not easily transferred to outsiders and unobservable firm quality determines the number of banking relationships and the credit cost and availability, the banking relationships and the credit contract terms become endogenous.
Determinants of unobservable firm quality are factors such as managerial ability, firms' reputation, or positive net investment opportunities that are often not fully captured by the observable data. The treatment of unobserved firm quality is particularly important when we use data on small and medium-sized firms since less observable and audited information is available for them than for listed companies. This paper reexamines the costs and benefits of multiple banking relationships using a panel data set for Japanese small and medium-sized firms for the period 2000-2002. This paper differs from preceding studies in three ways. First, unobserved firm heterogeneity (or unobserved firm effects) and the possible correlation between unobservable heterogeneous firm characteristics and banking relationships are considered. Second, financially constrained firms are singled out by estimating a disequilibrium model that allows for credit rationing, and the relationship between the nature of the banking relationship and credit availability is investigated. This approach differs from previous studies in that the latter define firms as financially constrained if they rely on other expensive external financial sources that are substitutes for bank credit. The third aspect in which this paper differs from previous studies on Japan is that it concentrates on small and medium-sized firms, while most preceding analyses have focused on bank-firm relationships among listed firms.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews previous theoretical and empirical studies and highlights their shortcomings. Section 3 describes the basic estimation strategy and our sample data. Section 4 presents the results of the estimation of the effect of banking relationships on the cost of credit. Section 5 presents the investigation into the effect of multiple banking relationships on the availability of credit for financially constrained firms. Section 6 concludes.
The effect of multiple banking relationships on credit cost and availability: theory and evidence
This section reviews what the theoretical literature has to say on the costs and benefits of multiple banking relationships, focusing on the effect of relationships on the pricing and availability of credit. It also discusses previous empirical studies on these issues relating to small and medium-sized firms. 1, 2 2.1 The cost and availability of credit and multiple banking relationships: Theoretical considerations From a theoretical point of view, multiple relationship banking can have both advantages and disadvantages, both of which are related to the fact that relationship 1 A survey of more general issues regarding relationship banking is provided by Boot (2000) . 2 This paper restricts itself to a discussion of multiple banking relationships, however the strength of banking relationships are measured in various ways: the duration of a bank-firm relationship (Petersen and Rajan 1994, 1995; Cole 1998; Degryse and Van Cayseele 2000) and the number of different services the firm purchases from the bank (Degryse and Van Cayseele 2000) . banks acquire private information on the borrowing firm. The benefit of a single banking relationship over multiple ones is that it can save overall monitoring costs (Diamond 1984) and transaction costs. On the other hand, the cost of a single banking relationship is that the single relationship bank may use its monopoly information and extract future rents (the "hold-up problem") (Sharpe 1990; Rajan 1992; von Thadden 1995) . In this environment, small and medium-sized firms that heavily rely on bank finance can protect themselves from such a hold-up problem by establishing a second banking relationship.
Multiple banking relationships also have conflicting implications with regard to credit availability. In the presence of information asymmetry between lenders and borrowers, adverse selection and moral hazard can lead to credit rationing (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981) . Thus, firms are unable to obtain all the credit they demand at the going market interest rate. Adverse selection problems are particularly severe in the market for small business financing. In this case, exclusive and long-term banking relationships can mitigate credit rationing since relationship banks internalize the benefits of subsidizing firms over time. At the same time, however, firms with a single banking relationship are more at risk of not being able to obtain additional credit if their bank refuses to provide it, because non-relational banks are likely to suspect that the firm is a lemon (due to the adverse selection problem). Possible reasons why a firm's single bank might refuse to provide additional credit are that the firm's quality is revealed to be bad or the bank itself faces a liquidity problem of its own. Therefore, anticipating adverse selection problems, both good and bad quality firms may choose to engage in multiple banking relationships to ensure stable access to finance.
The cost and availability of credit and multiple banking relationships: Empirical evidence
The empirical literature has produced mixed results regarding the effects of intensive banking relations on the cost and availability of loans. Using U.S small firm data, Petersen and Rajan (1994, 1995) find that a higher concentration in banking relationships leads to lower borrowing costs and less credit rationing. Harhoff and Körting (1998) , using survey data for small and medium-sized German firms with no more than 500 employees, find no correlation between the cost of debt and the number of relationship banks; however, firms with multiple banking relationships face more credit rationing than those with a single banking relationship. These studies provide evidence to support the hypothesis that an exclusive banking relationship provides a good incentive for banks to supply loans to credit constrained firms since it enables banks to obtain rents in the future (von Thadden 1995) . In contrast with these results, D 'Auria, Foglia, and Reedtz (1999) , using data on Italian firms, find a negative relationship between the interest rate of loans and the number of banking relationships.
However, what all these studies have in common is that they treat multiple banking relationships as exogenously given and regress credit cost and availability on banking relationship variables. Yet, if relationship variables capture unobserved firm characteristics, such as managers' ability or firms' quality, and credit contract terms are also determined by the firms' unobservable characteristics, then the relationship variables and credit cost and availability are endogenous and the estimated coefficients are biased. For example, when firms of unobservable high quality choose multiple banking relationships to counter potential opportunistic behavior by banks, the banking relationships and cost of credit are both determined by the firm's quality and become endogenous.
Some studies investigate what determines a firm's choice of number of banking relationships. Detragiache, Garella, and Guiso (2000) address this question by developing a model in which a firm with a good investment opportunity establishes multiple banking relationships from the start in order to avoid the risk of financing difficulties should a single bank run into liquidity problems. Using cross-section data for small and medium-sized Italian manufacturing firms, the authors then test the model and find that the number of banking relationships is positively correlated with the fragility of banks. Berger, Klapper, and Udell (2001) , using data set on Argentinean firms, find that small firms choose multiple banking relationships over a single banking relationship as a reaction to bank distress even though this increases their cost of credit. Cosci and Meliciani (2002) , using data provided by a large Italian bank, find that the number of banking relationships is positively correlated with a firm's leverage and the riskiness of the sector in which the firm operates. All these studies find that firms' quality and the fragility of their primary bank determine the firms' choice of the number of banking relationships.
Credit cost and availability are affected by other factors besides multiple banking relationships. Focusing on the effect of local credit market competition on lending relationships, Petersen and Rajan (1995) argue that banks are more likely to extend credit to financially constrained firms in a concentrated credit market because they can expect future monopoly rents. The authors support their hypothesis with evidence based on U.S. small and medium-sized firm data. On the other hand, Tsuruta (2004) , using panel data for Japanese small and medium-sized firms, finds that credit market competition does not affect the loan interest rate.
3. Econometric procedure and data
Econometric procedure
Assuming that a firm chooses the number of banking relationships optimally so as to maximize profits in the presence of informational asymmetry, multiple banking relationships and the cost and availability of credit are determined by the firm's unobservable quality and become endogenous. Moreover, assuming that information on firms' quality is obtained through relationship banking, and this information is not easily transferred to or verifiable by outsiders of the relation, it is also unobservable for an econometrician. In the analysis that follows, it is therefore assumed that firms' unobservable quality and banking relationships are constant over time.
Based on previous theoretical and empirical studies it is assumed that a firm's cost of credit is determined by its observable and unobservable characteristics, credit market competition, and its banking relationships. Observable characteristics, such as firm size, firms' default risk, the industry in which they operate, their legal status and other characteristics are discussed in detail in the next section. The unobservable characteristics capture firm quality such as managerial ability, firm reputation or investment opportunities. These determinants of firm quality are usually unobservable and are not fully captured by the observable characteristics proxied by income statement and balance sheet variables. The credit market competition variable is included to control for variations in the loan rate in local credit markets. 
For expositional simplicity, the equation above can be represented as follows:
where represents time-variant firm characteristics and local credit market competition in year . stands for time-invariant firm characteristics and firms' banking relationships. The unobservable firm heterogeneity is and disturbance term is assumed to be uncorrelated with the columns of and has zero mean and constant variance conditional on and .
is also assumed.
The estimation procedure of the HT estimator is as follows. and are partitioned as and . and are assumed to be uncorrelated with , whereas and are assumed to be correlated with .
For estimation, a two-step estimation procedure is used. First, consistent estimates of are taken from the within-groups estimation of (1). Second is substituted into a between-group version of (1) to obtain
. Since is correlated with , an instrumental variable method is used to estimate . The instruments for are the group means of .
The data used in this study are taken from JADE (Japanese Accounts and Data on Enterprises), which is a combination of the databases of Teikoku Databank and Bureau van Dijk and covers over 100,000 major Japanese firms including small and medium- 
Variables

Independent variable
The cost of credit is expressed as the percentage point spread between the interest rate paid by the firm and short-term prime rate to control for changes in the underlying cost of credit. A positive spread indicates that the firm has to pay an additional risk premium. The interest rate is calculated as the interest paid divided by the total outstanding loan amount (expressed in %). Data for the short-term prime rate is taken from the Financial and Economics Statistics Monthly issued by the Bank of Japan.
Firm characteristics
As for time-variant firm characteristics, the logarithm of total assets and the current assets/current liabilities ratio are included as proxies for firms' default risk. The interpretation of these variables is that larger firms and firms with a high current assets/current liabilities ratio are less risky. Sales growth is included in order to control for the different investment opportunities firms face. The expected sign of this variable is negative. Log (1+firm age) and log (1+firm age) 2 are included to take account of possible non-linear firm age effects. The expected sign of log (1+firm age) is negative because younger firms tend to be relatively informationally opaque and therefore pay higher interest rates on their loans. The tangible fixed assets/total assets ratio is included as a proxy for collateral. The expected sign of this variable is negative. To mitigate the skewness of the distribution of the financial data, the lower and upper 1% tails of the distribution are trimmed. As for time-invariant firm characteristics, a dummy that takes one if a firm is incorporated and zero otherwise and a stock listing dummy that equals one if a firm's stock is traded at the stock market and zero otherwise are included as proxies for risk. Industry dummies are also included to control for variations across industries.
Banking relationship variables
The sample firms obtain credit from two different types of banks: non-government banks and government-affiliated financial institutions. It is assumed that the nature of relationships with non-government banks is different from that with government-affiliated financial institutions. Since the latter are supposed to function as the so-called "last resort", credit-rationed firms are likely to obtain finance from government-affiliated financial institutions at low interest rates that do not reflect their true default risk. To isolate the effect of non-government banking relationships on the cost of credit, the number of firms' banking relationships is calculated by including only non-government banks, of which there are several types: city banks, regional and second-tier regional banks, credit associations, and credit coops. To take account of the government-affiliated financial institutions effect, a dummy variable is included that takes one if the firm borrows from one of the government-affiliated financial institutions for small business (Shoko Chukin Bank, Japan Finance Corporation for Small Business, and National Life Finance Corporation) and zero otherwise. Also included is a dummy for city banks that takes one if the borrower's main bank is a city bank because the interest rate charged by city banks tends to be lower than that charged by other national banks. The database does not contain information on the length of banking relationships, an issue that has been investigated in some of the previous studies.
Credit market competition
In order to control for variations in lending rates attributable to the degree of competition in the different regional loan markets, a measure of bank concentration in the local credit market is included. The measure is defined as the lending share of the In order to partition explanatory variables into exogenous and endogenous ones described in the HT procedure, it is examined whether the variables are latent-choice variables or have a correlation with unobservable firm characteristics such as managerial ability. Firms' characteristics such as total assets and firm age, the current assets/current liabilities ratio, and credit market competition are considered as exogenous variables , while firms' time-invariant characteristics such as firms' legal form, stock market listing status, industry dummies, and prefecture dummies are represented by Z .
contains the tangible fixed assets ratio and other proxy variables for firms' quality. contains the banking relationship variables, i.e. the
Z number of banking relationships and the dummy for government-affiliated financial institutions for small business. The city bank dummy is treated as a time-invariant exogenous variable since city banks have few branch offices in local credit markets and since whether a firm can obtain credit from a city bank is partly determined by local credit market conditions.
Specification tests
Prior to estimating equation (1) by the HT procedure, the validity of the exogeneity condition is tested using the Hausman test based on the difference between the within and the random estimator. The specification test statistics are presented in table 2. The test statistic is 1165.43 which is distributed as χ 2 (8) and is significant at the 1% level.
The highly significant test statistics indicate that is correlated with some of the explanatory variables and a random effects model is inappropriate. level, suggesting that multiple banking is costly. The coefficient on the dummy for borrowing from government-affiliated banks is negative and highly significant. This result is consistent with the notion that the government-affiliated financial institutions can set the interest rate at a lower level than the non-government banks and that small and medium-sized firms who can borrow from government-affiliated financial institutions are in a better position when negotiating borrowing rates with non-government banks. The significant negative relationships (at the 1% level) between the interest rate and log (total assets) as well as the current assets/current liabilities ratio imply that larger and less risky firms can get access to cheaper credit. The coefficient on the tangible fixed assets/total assets ratio is negative and significant at the 1% level. Firms can borrow at a lower interest rate when they have more tangible assets for collateral. Contrary to expectation, the coefficient on the firm age variable is positive. The coefficient on the dummy indicating whether a firm is incorporated is negative, but statistically insignificant. Finally, the coefficient on the stock listing dummy is negative and significant at the 1% level, suggesting that firms listed on the stock market are charged a lower risk premium.
Controlling for firms' observable quality
It may be argued that the variable on the number of banking relationships captures the effect of firm quality that is uncontrolled for in the estimation above. In other words, the observed positive correlation between the cost of credit and the number of banking relationships may be due to omitted variables that are possibly correlated with the banking relationship variable. One possible scenario is that the higher cost of credit of firms engaged in multiple banking relationships is a reflection of the quality of those firms as only lower-quality firms would engage in multiple banking relationships to avoid the liquidation of an ongoing project in case the primary bank denies refinancing for the project (Petersen and Rajan 1994) . To test this hypothesis, the observable time-varying quality of the firm is controlled for by including the operating profit/interest ratio (interest coverage ratio) and a financial distress dummy that takes one if a firm was in financial distress within the last three years. Lagged values of the interest coverage ratio are used to avoid simultaneity problems. The expected sign for the interest coverage ratio variable is negative, while that for the financial distress dummy is positive. This estimation is labeled Model II and the results are displayed in table 2. The coefficients on the interest coverage ratio and the financial distress dummy show the expected signs and are significant at the 1% and the 10% level, respectively.
When a firm generates sufficient profits to pay the interest on its loans, the cost of credit is lower. However, firms that experienced financial distress in the preceding three years face lower credit costs. The estimation results on the banking relationship variables hold even when the quality of the firm is controlled for. The results of the other variables also remain unchanged. Petersen and Rajan (1995) In sum, the estimation of Models I, II, and III suggest that multiple banking relationships are costly in terms of the interest rate borrowers need to pay and this result is robust when firms' quality and credit market competition are controlled for. Therefore, the question naturally arises as to why firms establish multiple banking relationships despite the costs?
Credit market competition
[Insert Table 2] 5. Credit availability In this section, the effect of multiple banking relationships on credit availability is investigated. Why do firms establish multiple banking relationships despite the costs?
One way to think about this is to consider a firm with a profitable investment opportunity that requires capital in several tranches. Under these circumstances, a firm with a single banking relationship is more at risk of having to liquidate the project if the bank refuses to provide credit at a later stage. Given this risk, the cost of credit is a relatively minor consideration. Unfortunately, information on whether firms have been refused credit by their first bank is unavailable. This section therefore analyzes the effect of multiple banking relationships on access to credit for financially constrained firms. The reason for focusing on financially constrained firms is that, all else being equal, the effect of banking relationships on credit availability is relevant only for financially constrained firms. This paper singles out constrained firms by estimating a disequilibrium model. 3 The estimation strategy in this part of the analysis is as follows.
First, the sample is partitioned into credit constrained and unconstrained firms by estimating a disequilibrium model that allows for credit rationing. Next, the effect of banking relationships is estimated for credit constrained firms.
A disequilibrium model
A disequilibrium model with unknown sample separation, as described by Maddala (2000) and Atanasova and Wilson (2004) , the amount of bank credit demanded is modeled as a function of the level or the expansion of firm activity, firm size, other sources of capital that are substitutes to bank loans, and the cost of bank credit. The maximum amount of credit available to a firm is modeled as a function of the firm's collateral and default risk. 
Loan i
In the demand equation, the level of firm activity is measured by sales, and substitutes for bank loans are proxied by cash flow and net trade credit. Net trade credit is calculated as the differences between notes payable trade plus accounts payable trade and notes receivable trade plus debtors' accounts receivable trade. The expected sign of the firm activity variable is positive because firms' demand for cash increases with the expansion of their business activities (the transaction cost motive for demanding cash).
The expected signs of the variables for bank loan substitutes are negative. The cost of bank credit is expressed as the percentage point spread between the interest rate paid by the firm and short-term prime rate and is expected to have a negative effect on loan demand. Sales growth is included to control for firms' investment opportunities.
In the supply equation, firms' collateral is measured by tangible fixed assets and total assets. Firms' default risk is measured by the ability to pay interest and the ability to pay short-term debt. The former is represented by the operating profit/interest ratio, while the latter is represented by the current assets/current liabilities ratio. A high operating profit/interest ratio or a high current assets/current liabilities ratio indicates that the default risk is low. Therefore, the expected signs of collateral variable and variables indicating the ability to pay interest are all positive. All level variables are divided by total assets to reduce heteroscedasticity. Thus, the size effect of in the demand function above is estimated as a constant term, while the constant term is estimated as a coefficient of the reciprocal of total assets. The same logic is applied to the collateral effect of total assets and the constant term in the supply function. Both equations contain log (GDP) to control for macroeconomic conditions. To control for unobservable firm-fixed effects, first differences of the equations are estimated. In this way, banking relationships that might affect the maximum amount of credit available to firms are also eliminated. Other time-constant firm characteristics such as firms' legal status and industry specific effects that might affect the demand equation are also eliminated. To take first differences, data for the year 1999 is also used. The first-differenced variables are again truncated at the lower and upper 1% tails of the distribution and the total number of firm-year observations is 70,171. The model is estimated by the maximum likelihood method.
The estimation results are presented in table 3. The coefficients in the supply equation
show the expected sign and are highly significant. Firms with more collateral, as measured by the tangible fixed asset/total assets ratio, obtain more credit. The results for the operating profit/interest ratio and the current assets/current liabilities ratio suggest that firms' ability to pay interest and short-term debt is also an important determining factor of loan availability besides collateral. In the demand equation, the coefficients on the cash flow/total assets ratio and on the net trade credit/total assets ratio have the expected sign and are significant at the 1% level. Firms with a larger internal cash flow and greater other outside financial resources have a lower demand for bank loans. The coefficient on the percentage point spread between the loan interest rate paid by the firm and the short-term prime rate shows the expected sign and is highly significant. Contrary to expectation, the estimated coefficient on the sales/total assets ratio has a negative sign. The negative and significant coefficient on the sales growth variable suggests that growing firms generate greater internal cash flow and therefore have a lower demand for bank loans.
[Insert Table 3 ]
Credit availability
Next, the investigation turns to the effect of multiple banking relationships on the availability of credit for credit-constrained firms. Based on the results obtained in the previous section, a firm is defined as financially constrained in year if the probability that the desired amount of bank credit in year t exceeds the maximum amount of credit available in the same year is greater than 0.5. Following Gersovitz (1980) , the probability that firm will face a financial constraint in year is derived as follows: 
Over the whole sample period 2000-2002, the average proportion of financial constrained firms is 39.75%.
Next, using only the sample of financially constrained firms, the effect of banking relationships on credit availability is estimated. Conditional on the demand of credit, the availability of credit is determined by firms' collateral, default risk, other firm characteristics, banking relationships, credit market competition, and firms' unobservable characteristics. Although the observed amount of bank credit should be on the supply curve since the firms are liquidity constrained and fail to obtain the desired amount of bank credit, demand factors for loans are also included to lessen the identification problems. The equation is estimated using the Hausman-Taylor method. The dependent variable is the total outstanding loan amount/total assets *100. Firms' collateral is measured by the tangible fixed assets/total assets ratio, while the firms' default risk is measured by the current assets/current liabilities ratio, the operating profit/interest ratio, and the financial distress dummy. Log (1+firm age) and log (1+firm age) 2 are included as proxies for firms' informational opaqueness. Time-invariant firm characteristics, bank relationship characteristics, and credit market competition are represented by the same variables in table 2. The predicted value of the loan demand calculated from the previous estimation is used as a measure of the demand for loans. Log (total assets) and debt/total assets are also included to control for firms' size effect and debt capacity, respectively. Year dummies are also included. Firms' unobservable characteristics are captured by , which is assumed to be . The disturbance term is assumed to be uncorrelated with all of the explanatory variables and and has zero mean and constant variance conditional on all of the explanatory variables besides . The predicted demand, the tangible fixed assets ratio, the interest coverage ratio, and the distress dummy are assumed to be endogenous time-variant variables, while banking relationship variables such as the number of banking relationships and the dummy for government-affiliated financial institutions for small business are assumed to be endogenous time-invariant variables; the rest of the variables are assumed to be
The results of the estimation are presented in table 4. The base line model is labeled
Model IV. The coefficient on the number of banking relationships in Model IV is positive and significant at the 1% level. Among financially constrained firms, those with multiple banking relationships obtain more credit. This result implies that multiple banking relationships relax firms' credit constraints. On the other hand, the coefficient on the dummy for borrowing from government-affiliated banks, unexpectedly, is negative and significant, implying that firms which borrow from government-affiliated banks obtain less credit than those that do not. A possible explanation of this unexpected result is that the dummy for borrowing from government-affiliated banks may partly capture firms' observable quality, since it is low quality firms that tend to apply for loans from government-affiliated banks as a "last resort" and the coefficient on the measures of firms' risk of default (the operating profit/interest ratio and the distress dummy) show the predicted signs but are insignificant. The negative and significant coefficient on the dummy indicating whether the first bank is a city bank is consistent with the large-bank barriers hypothesis. This hypothesis posits that large banks have difficulties in establishing lending relationships with small and medium-sized firms because of organizational diseconomies and organizational hierarchical structures that put large banks at a disadvantage when it comes to gathering soft information (Berger and Udell 2002; Stein 2002 ).
The coefficient on the tangible assets ratio is highly significant and positive, as expected. This result suggests that credit constraints are lessened when firms have more collateral. The positive and significant coefficient on the current assets/current liabilities assets ratio indicates that more bank credit is available when firms' ability to repay short-term debt is higher. The coefficients on the log (1+firm age) and the log [Insert Table 4] 6. Conclusion
This paper reexamined the costs and benefits of multiple banking relationships using a panel data set for Japanese small and medium-sized firms over the period [2000] [2001] [2002] .
By employing the Hausman-Taylor estimator, this paper attempted to consider the correlation between unobservable firm characteristics (unobservable firm quality) and multiple banking relationships that previous studies have ignored.
The main results can be summarized as follows. First, a positive relationship between the number of banking relationships and the cost of credit is observed even after controlling for firm quality. Second, multiple banking relationships have a positive effect on the availability of credit for financially constrained firms. These results imply that financially constrained firms forge multiple banking relationships in order to be certain of having access to credit, even if this guarantee raises the overall cost of credit.
These results contradict the empirical findings of Petersen and Rajan (1994) and Harhoff and Körting (1998) that a concentration of banking relationships leads to less credit rationing, suggesting that the hold-up problem does not to apply to small business financing in Japan. Third, less credit is available when firms' first bank is fragile. Fourth, less credit is extended to financially constrained firms when firms' first bank is a city bank, indicating larger banks are reluctant to supply credit to smaller, riskier firms. These findings imply that small and medium-sized firms are vulnerable to liquidity shocks to their banks and the consolidation of large Japanese banks may have a further negative impact on small business financing.
This paper could be extended in several directions. One area that could be examined 
Table 2. Determinants of firms' cost of credit
The dependent variable is the percentage point spread between the loan interest rate paid by firms and the short-term prime rate. The coefficients are estimated by the Hausman and Taylor estimator. The vectors X 1 , X 2 , Z 1 , and Z 2 contain time-varying exogenous, time-varying endogenous, time-invarying exogenous, and time-invarying endogenous variables, respectively. The lower and upper 1% tails of the distribution of the financial variables, such as total assets, the tangible fixed assets/total assets ratio, the current assets/current liabilities ratio, sales growth, and the operating profit/interest ratio, are trimmed. Each regression includes industry dummies, prefecture dummies, and year dummies. 
